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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of repression is integral to Freudian theory. 
Repression is the main defense mechanism described by Freud 
and was frequently considered to be synonymous with the word 
defense (e.g., Madison, 1961, p. 17). Basically, Freud be­
lieved: "The essense of repression lies simply in the func­
tion of rejecting and keeping something out of conscious­
ness," (Freud, 1915, p. 86). This "something" that is re­
pressed is the "instinct-presentation" which are ideas 
(thoughts) and affectations associated with an instinct, 
whose presence in consciousness results in pain. The pain is 
a product of awareness and satisfaction of an instinct that 
is incompatible with learned perceptions of one's self, or in 
Freudian terminology (Freud, 1915, p. 84) the pain develops 
through the awareness of ego threatening ideas or memories. 
Thus a person confronted with an anxious situation (an ego 
threatening event) will tend not to remember that event. 
Repression is not a loss of memory due to simply decay 
or interference, but rather a purposeful, selective "forget­
ting." Highly anxious material is taken from consciousness, 
and placed in an unconscious memory store (the unconscious). 
In this way the person is protected from experiencing pain. 
The material appears to be forgotten but, in theory, remains 
in the unconscious where it has limited access to conscious 
2 
memory. Later in this paper the unconscious will be further 
delineated in terms of Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1971) concep­
tion of it as a memory store without adequate retrieval cues 
(cues that aid in the recall of repressed memories). 
Once in the unconscious, the repressed memory contin­
uously exerts pressure towards conscious expression. Accord­
ing to Freud, it typically is successful in emerging in the 
form of neurotic symptoms, dreams, jokes, and slips of the 
tongue. Thus, in psychoanalysis, the major emphasis is on 
the retrieval of these repressed memories in an attempt to 
eliminate neurotic symptoms that are a direct manifestation 
of repressed memories. Only by bringing the memories into 
consciousness can the therapist help the client to eliminate 
the underlying cause of his inhibiting, and sometimes crip­
pling, symptomology. 
Even in the more contemporary psychotherapies, repression 
is a central concept. For example, the Gestalt therapist em­
phasizes the need to bring the client to his impasse, the 
blocking point of memory. The client has blocked from aware­
ness painful memories and thus limits access to important 
information that is essential for making constructive decisions. 
This is a direct translation of the Freudian concept of repres­
sion. The process is repeatedly present in almost all forms 
of psychotherapy which emphasize "insight." 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate this purported 
3 
ubiquitous process of repression. The intent is to: (1) 
clearly define the concept of repression, (2) present some of 
the major findings in repression research and some alterna­
tive hypotheses that have been suggested to account for these 
experimental findings, and (3) describe a study by the pres­
ent author that was designed to control for alternative hy­
potheses while demonstrating and further elucidating the re­
pression process via the use of retrieval cues. 
Repression Defined 
As described above, repression is a defense mechanism 
purported by Freud to account for the loss from consciousness 
(working memory) of ego threatening memories. The repression 
process protects an individual from experiencing severe anx­
iety, in contrast to just unpleasant feelings, (Rapaport, 
1942, p. 42) by compartmentalizing highly threatening mem­
ories into the unconscious, a memory store where information 
is difficult to retrieve. This is an unconscious, automatic 
process in the sense that the repressor is unaware that any 
transfer of information is taking place (Bollard and Miller, 
1950, p. 220). 
Freud describes two types of repression, primal repres­
sion and repression proper (Brenner, 1957), Primal repres­
sion refers to the process of shunting information directly 
into the unconscious without the material ever being present 
in conscious memory. This type of defense is traditionally 
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characterized as a protective mechanism from early, traumatic, 
childhood experiences. For example, a child that is exposed 
to an imexplainable, hence threatening situation, like an 
aggressive sexual scene between his or her parents, immedi­
ately relegates the memory of this event to the unconscious 
where it remains protected from working memory. Research 
with this type of repression has been widely explored under 
the rubric of perceptual defense. Briefly the basic paradigm 
of the perceptual defense literature involves the tachisto-
scopic presentation, of brief duration, of low valued or 
taboo words and high valued or nonanxious words. The most 
common finding is that the threshold of perception is higher 
for words associated with anxious material. This result has 
been presented as evidence for primal repression. A review 
of the perceptual defense literature has been presented else­
where (Eriksen and Pierce, 1968) and will not be described 
in detail here. 
The second type of repression, repression power, refers 
to the process of transferring material, that was once in 
conscious memory, to the unconscious, due to its anxiety lad­
en content. Madison (1961, p. 20) refers to this process as 
a manipulation of conscious memory. That is, a person ex­
posed to an anxious situation will subsequently manipulate 
the memory of this situation in order to reduce or eliminate 
the anxiety involved. 
Brenner (1957) presented three main characteristics of 
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repression proper: (1) it involves motivated selective 
forgetting, (2) it is under unconscious control, and (3) 
the repressed information is not lost but instead remains in 
the unconscious. 
It is apparent that both types of repressions share the 
basic characteristics of defense from anxiety and involve 
placing anxiety-provoking memories into the unconscious. In 
fact, it is difficult to clearly distinguish repression prop­
er from primal repression. The basis for distinction that is 
traditionally used is that repression proper involves taking 
information from conscious memory and placing it into the un­
conscious, while primal repression, theoretically, avoids 
consciousness entirely and anxious "memories" are directly 
placed into the unconscious. This distinction is dubious since 
even with primal repression, information must receive some 
degree of conscious processing in order for its threatening 
nature to be recognized. The information in both types of 
repression must be in consciousness for some period of time, 
(although it may be argued that it is a much shorter period 
of time for repression proper) and thus the distinction be­
tween the two types of repression was even recognized by 
Freud when he stated that repression proper was not possible 
unless childhood (primal) repression had occurred with similar 
material at an earlier period of life (Madison, 1961, p. 93). 
This implies, that not only does it share basic chacarteris-
tics, repression proper involves even the same memories as the 
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ones that were placed in the unconscious during primal repres­
sion. 
The experimental literature reviewed in the present paper 
will basically focus on the "repression proper literature", 
however, some mention will be made of relevant primal repres­
sion literature, given the above justification explicating 
the similarities between the two types of repression. Basi­
cally most of the contemporary research described followed 
a standard format. Typically, situations were devised to mo­
tivate people to selectively "forget" material that was associ­
ated with threat and retain information that was not. Recall 
tests were used to demonstrate lower retention of threat-asso­
ciated material (material presented contiguous to threat). 
Some of the more thorough investigators (e.g., Flavell, 1955) 
also demonstrated the availability of the material once the 
threat value was removed. In a sense what is being measured 
by these experiments is the level of retention or the memory 
of the individual. In theory, the retention level is only 
being used as a reflection of the emotions involved in a given 
situation (Rapaport, 1942, p. 102). Another way of looking 
at this is to ask the question: In what way does an intense 
emotional state (e.g., an anxious state) affect a person's 
memory of a given event? The experiments described below 
are examples of attempts to answer this question. 
7 
Experimental Demonstrations of Repression 
Historically there have been two major waves of research 
attempting to demonstrate the process of repression. Rapa-
port (1942) presents research that describes the earlier 
wave (early 1900s). He outlines the many association exper­
iments of Jung (pages 45-51) in which reaction time (RT) was 
recorded to indicate how long it took participants in his ex­
periments to think of a response or free associate to each word 
that was provided. Long RTs were used as indicators of what 
Jung labeled as complexes or repressed memories of painful 
events. Rapaport astutely points out (page 51) that while 
Jung's association experiments do provide some indirect evi­
dence for the effects of emotions on memory, the results provide 
inconclusive support for repression theory since long RTs were 
not directly traced but rather assumed to involve "complexes". 
The other research detailed by Rapaport proved to be 
equally nonconclusive. Much of the experimentation involved 
the differential recall of pleasant and unpleasant stimuli in 
an attempt to tie directly an emotional factor (unpleasantness) 
to material that could potentially be recalled. These ex­
periments typically used very few participants, had insufficient 
controls, had poor connections to any theoretical base, and 
often did not control for learning of material. Rapaport con­
cluded, after reviewing this literature, that at this point 
very little experimental evidence exists to validate the 
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presumed multitude of qualitative clinical indications of 
a Freudian repression mechanism. 
The contemporary wave of repression research began in 
the early 1950s. Holmes (1974) reviewed extensively a large 
section of this more recent literature and concluded his 
review with the following cogent statement : 
it appears that either new research must be conducted 
which support the concept of repression, or the concept 
of repression must be discarded and the variety of con­
cepts related to or dependent upon the concept of re­
pression will have to be reevaluated or reinterpreted. 
In view of the amount and consistency of the data ac­
cumulated to this point, and pending new data supporting 
the concept of repression, the continued use of repres­
sion as an explanation for behavior does not seem 
justifiable. 
It is clear that Holmes, as with Rapaport after his review of 
the earlier literature, believes that there is a lack of ex­
perimental support for the concept of repression. 
Although Holmes' conclusion will strike the typical 
clinician as somewhat extreme, it does point out the need for 
experimental support of the repression theory. It is pos­
sible that repression does not exist but a possible alternative 
to explain the lack of experimental evidence is that the liter­
ature to date has misrepresented in the laboratory what Freud 
had observed on his couch. That is, perhaps some important 
elements of the repression notion have been altered from its 
clinical form in the transposition to the rigorous experimental 
conditions of the laboratory. What follows is a somewhat 
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detailed review and analysis of some of the contemporary re­
pression literature. The analysis includes comments as to 
how the author perceives repression theory has been misrepre­
sented and suggests procedural changes which might be made 
to test more accurately a repression theory. 
The prototype design for the recent experimental research 
on repression was presented by Zeller (1950). Zeller pre­
sented two experiments which he felt demonstrated the process 
of repression. In experiment I, participants were required 
to leam a list of nonsense syllables. Three days later each 
relearned the syllables to criterion and were then divided 
into two groups. Both groups were given a psychomotor task. 
The task was structured such that all the participants in the 
control group performed well and were given positive feedback. 
In contrast, the task for the experimental group was designed 
such that they were all forced to fail. The hypothesis was 
that the experimental group would find the task ego threatening 
and would repress the associated syllables. This was in fact 
what resulted in the subsequent test. The experimental group 
took significantly longer to reach criterion than did the 
control group. Zeller then had the participants retake the 
psychomotor task and this time structured the task such that 
all were successful. The participants were then retested for 
retention of the syllables and the results indicated that both 
groups performed equally well. Thus Zeller had demonstrated 
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both repression and the removal of repression with the 
lifting of the ego threatening situation. 
In his second experiment, Zeller added two experimental 
groups to his basic paradigm to determine how specific were 
the effects of repression. The first additional group was 
told that it had failed only the motor task and had done 
well on the nonsense syllable test. The second group was told 
that it had done poorly on both tasks. Thus the three exper­
imental groups represented situations with failure either ex­
plicitly associated with motor task (positive feedback on the 
nonsense syllable test) or failure explicitly assigned to both 
tasks, or failure on the motor task with no specific reference 
to the performance with the nonsense syllables. The results 
clearly demonstrated that a memory deficit resulted only when 
the threat was associated specifically with the memory task 
and did not result when the memory task was separated from the 
threat as with the group given positive feedback on syllable 
retention. Thus, Zeller concluded that he had not only exper­
imentally demonstrated repression, but demonstrated further 
that repression was restricted to memory explicitly associated 
with a threatening situation. 
Flavell (1955) presented evidence that gave further exper­
imental support for the process of repression. Flavell had 
participants learn a list of nonsense syllables and then give 
word associations for each syllable. In the second session. 
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the syllables and the associations were read aloud. The 
experimental group was informed that a professor of psy­
chology was to rate each association as "normal" or "abnor­
mal." This manipulation was devised to associate the syl­
lables with a threat to personal adjustment. It had the 
added benefit of associating only half the words with the 
threat and the other half with no threat at all. In this 
way specificity of the effects of ego threat could be tested. 
The control group had the syllables and the words read aloud 
to it but no ratings of normalcy were given. 
The results generally supported the findings of Zeller. 
The participants with the threat associated with syllables per­
formed significantly poorer on the subsequent recall test 
than did participants in the control group. An examination 
of the recall of the experimental group in terms of syllables 
with and without threat showed no differences in retention for 
the two types of words. Flavell, unlike Zeller, concluded that 
repression had a general effect of lower retention for all syl­
lables and did not exclusively interfere with syllables 
directly associated with threat, 
Flavell further demonstrated that the effects of repres­
sion could be eliminated by removing the threat. In the last 
phase of his experiment Flavell exposed the deception that 
the ratings of normal and abnormal for word associations were 
contrived. He then tested the participants for retention and 
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found no differences between retention level for the control 
and experimental groups. He concluded that repressed mate­
rial could be recovered once the threat associated with the 
memory was dispelled. 
At this point it appears that syllables associated with 
ego threat have a tendency not to be recalled. It also ap­
pears to be an unconscious inhibition of recall, for people 
apparently try, but are unable, to recall the words. The 
question remains as to what is the actual process involved 
with the inhibition of the memory. Can the process accurately 
be called repression? The answer to this question is complex. 
The experiments of Zeller and Flavell clearly approximate the 
process of repression in that threat-associated information 
was lost and subsequently recovered. What these studies fail 
to demonstrate is how this process works. How did the infor­
mation that was "repressed" become available once the threat 
association was removed? This aspect will be further explored 
later in this paper. 
Another related point is that perhaps an alternative 
process could provide a more parsimonious explanation for these 
repression-like findings. For example, one possibility is that 
the information associated with threat was simply interfered 
with, rather than repressed. That is, the threat may have 
distracted the participant's attention and consequently inter­
fered with the learning or releaming of the nonsense syllables. 
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Thus, an alternate explanation of forgetting in the Zeller and 
Flavell studies is interference or response competition. This 
would imply that once the threat was removed as in Flavell's 
experiment, the competing response (thinking about the threat) 
was no longer potentially interfering. 
Support for the interference explanation of the previous 
repression-like findings was presented by D'Zurilla (1965). 
D'Zurilla utilized a "test designed to detect homosexual ten­
dencies" as an ego threat that was associated with a list of 
words that the experimental group had learned. The control 
group learned the same list but did not have the threat associa­
ted with it. This experiment as described so far is similar 
to previous repression studies; however, D'Zurilla added an 
interesting addition to his study. At the end of the experi­
ment, a structured interview was given to determine what people 
were thinking about at different points in the experiment. The 
results of the memory part of the study were consistent with 
past studies : Participants who learned words that were later 
threat associated retained significantly fewer words than con­
trol group participants. However, contrary to a repression 
interpretation, the structured interview revealed that people, 
instead of avoiding the threatening situation, were actively 
thinking about the threat, and could remember the threat 
throughout the experiment. This implies that the threat was 
interfering with retention, not via the process of repression. 
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but due to competing response interference. 
Holmes (1972) tested the interference hypothesis direct­
ly. Holmes had participants learn a list of high frequency 
nouns and tested their retention. He then administered a mul­
tiple choice Rorschach test with the choice items composed of 
the words from the previously learned list. Three groups were 
defined in terms of the type of personality feedback that was 
given following the Rorschach. One group received "ego-
threatening" personality feedback by being informed that it 
was poorly adjusted. A second group was informed that it was 
highly creative and high on leadership qualities ("ego-en­
hancing" personality feedback), and a third group (control 
group) received neutral feedback. According to repression 
theory, the ego-threatening group should perform poorer on 
subsequent recall tests than either the control of ego-enhanc­
ing groups. This was not the prediction made by Holmes. 
Holmes reasoned that interference or response competition was 
responsible for previous repression-like findings and there­
fore the ego-threatening and ego-enhancing group should per­
form at an equal level, significantly poorer than the control 
group. The basic assumption here is that people given non-
neutral feedback will be inclined to process feedback infor­
mation rather than focus on the lists of words. The results 
conformed to Holmes' prediction. The participants in the 
threat and enhancement groups performed at the same level. 
Also, the recall for participants in the neutral group 
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increased from before feedback to after, while the other 
groups' recall remained at the same level. Holmes con­
cluded that both the threat and enhancement feedback that 
was associated with the list of words lowered recall due to 
response competition and not as a result of repression. 
The results of Holmes and D'Zurilla's studies raise con­
siderable doubt as to whether past experimental evidence (e.g., 
Zeller, 1950; Flavell, 1955) are demonstrations of the proc­
ess of repression. It does appear that interference effects 
could more parsimoniously account for the results. However, 
Holmes (1974) even suggests that the results of his experi­
ment are not conclusively in favor of an interference explana­
tion. It is true that both ego-threat and ego-enhancement 
groups performed equally and poorer than the control groups, 
but perhaps two different processes are involved. The ego-
enhancement feedback clearly seems to have been a competing 
response to the list learning, but this does not necessarily 
indicate that the same process was causing poor performance 
in the ego-threat group. The repression hypothesis is a less 
likely explanation, yet remains a viable alternative. 
There have been numerous other publications purporting to 
demonstrate the process of repression under a wide variety of 
experimental situations (e.g., Penn, 1964; Aborn, 1953; and 
Truax, 1957). One study by Milliken and Kirchner (1971) 
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instructed counseling graduate students to identify with 
a counselor in a videotape simulation of a counselor-client 
interchange. The client in the videotape role played four 
different affective states and the identifying counselor was 
required to recall from each of the four interviews. The 
results of an objective test showed impairment of recall for 
interviews associated with "anger" and "minimal effect". 
That is, the greater the anxiety of the counselors, the poorer 
was their performance on the recall test. 
The authors interpreted these findings in terms of per­
ceptual defense theory. Anxious material was seen as having 
a higher perceptual threshold than pleasant and neutral ma­
terial. This implies that primal repression had occurred 
to avoid the ego-threatening material. An alternative expla­
nation is equally plausible. The participants might have 
repressed the material after it had already entered conscious­
ness (repression proper) and thus avoided maintaining think­
ing about the anxious material. A third possibility is an 
interference explanation as posited by Holmes for the results 
of his study. The participants may have been attending to 
their anxious feelings and as a result were unable to process 
and retain the content of the interview. If this was the 
case, it is confusing as to why the pleasant affective state 
interview wasn't equally interfering. Perhaps pleasant states 
are not as strong a competing response as anxious states. 
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The results remain unclear. 
Future research must provide an experimental situation 
that demonstrates lower recall of threatening information 
without permitting an interference theory interpretation of 
the results. The best example of this type of research at 
present is the Milliken and Kirchner study described above. 
Unlike most repression studies, the threatening material in 
this study was also the material to be recalled. Typically, 
the threat and the material to be recalled are two distinct 
sets of words, allowing an interference interpretation to be 
a more viable explanation of lower recall. For example, in 
the Zeller (1950) experiment, nonsense syllables were asso­
ciated with an ego-threatening motor task. The material to 
be repressed and the threatening event were two different 
events. This led Holmes (1974) to interpret the lower recall 
of threat-associated syllables as being due to the interfer­
ence of attending to the memory of the threatening task. 
Even in the Holmes (1972) study where the threat and 
"repressed words" were closely linked (the repressed words 
were the response words in the threatening Rorschach test), 
it can be argued that the words were not threatening in 
themselves and were therefore separate from the threat it­
self. Only in designs like the Milliken and Kirchner study 
is it possible to nullify an interference interpretation of 
the forgetting of threatening material. The forgotten words 
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were the threat and a repression process is a more likely-
interpretation of their results. An interference explana­
tion is not probable because the threat itself was repressed 
and thus could not be indicated as a competing response. 
One last point about future research was suggested 
earlier in that one of the major deficiencies of the studies 
supporting the concept of repression is the lack of evidence 
that the "repressed" memories were in fact still in memory 
(in the unconscious). Zeller and Milliken and Kirchner, 
all demonstrated that threat-associated words were clearly 
not recalled as well as words associated with neutral or posi­
tive events. This supports the selective forgetting charac­
teristic of repression. However, what these authors failed tO/ 
demonstrate was that these memory traces were repressed into 
the unconscious rather than simply forgotten. In order to 
prove that repression is in operation, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the memory traces exist but are simply dif­
ficult to retrieve. Flavell did meet this requirement in his 
experiment by demonstrating the return of information that 
had been lost. Unfortunately, as described above, an alter­
nate explanation was found to be more parsimonious than one 
provided by repression theory. What remains unexplored, is 
how a repression process would work under circumstances where 
a competing response analysis was not a viable interpretation. 
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Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971) describe a two-store memory 
model that explicates the process of retrieval of repressed 
memory traces. They note that "the Freudian concept of re­
pressed memories can be considered as being an inability of 
the person to generate an appropriate probe". A probe, as 
defined by these authors, is a subset of information that is 
activated from long-term memory (permanent storage) and placed 
in short-term memory (consciousness or working memory) to be 
scanned for the desired image. A decision is made after 
scanning as to whether the desired image has been located. 
Repression, in this framework, is an active process that in­
hibits the use of an appropriate probe or retrieval cue with 
which to locate a memory trace. 
The probe theory placed in context with the repression 
literature indicates that retrieval cues may be used to 
demonstrate that repressed information is still present in 
memory. Retrieval cues may take the form of features of the 
repressed memories that could potentially comprise the memory 
probe. Examples of the type of features that might be used 
are: one of the repressed words themselves, or a visual aid 
depicting a scene from the repressed event. Theoretically 
the presentation of the repressed word, or visual aid, should 
help to restore the memory of the words that constitute the 
threat. This would serve to demonstrate that the repressed 
words were, in fact, in memory (in the unconscious) but were 
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not retrievable without cueing. 
In conclusion of this review of the repression litera­
ture, there exists little clear evidence for the Freudian 
concept of repression. Most of the studies that have pur­
ported to support repression theory have been shovm to have 
a more parsimonious competing response interpretation. 
Other studies fail to meet some of the major requirements of 
repression theory like demonstrating the return of informa­
tion after it has been shown to be lost from memory. The 
next section describes an experiment that attempts to elim­
inate the above difficulties. The experiment was designed 
to create a situation in which competing response was not a 
viable explanation for the loss of memory. It also was de­
signed to demonstrate the return of information that had been 
lost from conscious memory. 
An Experimental Demonstration of Freudian Repression 
The present study was designed to determine whether re­
pression can be experimentally demonstrated in the labora­
tory. Specifically, can a simulated homosexual or hetero­
sexual encounter elicit a strong enough anxiety reaction to 
induce the use of repression as a defense? A sexual threat 
was chosen specifically for this study since sex, according 
to Freud (Freud, 1901, p. 243), is the only ego threat, threat 
to self-esteem (Madison, 1961, p. 121), that motivates the 
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use of repression as a defense. 
Two basic methodological innovations were devised in 
an attempt to avoid the inconclusive results of past repres­
sion research. For one, the present design had as synonymous 
the threat used to invoke anxiety, and the actual target ma­
terial, whose recollection (or lack or recollection) would be 
used as a measure of repression. This innovation was utilized 
to avoid an interference interpretation (e.g., D'Zurilla, 1965 
and Holmes, 1974) of repression-like results. Lower recall 
of threat related words would mean that the threat itself was 
repressed and preclude the competing response explanation that 
participants were thinking of the threatening material and 
could not recall target words. 
The second innovation in methodology involves the use of 
retrieval cues, as suggested by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971), 
to demonstrate that losses in recall of threat-associated 
words (in this case the threat itself) are due to the lack 
of accessibility of repressed information, as opposed to 
simple forgetting (decay or interference). Most of the 
studies (e.g., Zeller, 1950; Truax, 1957) that have purported 
to demonstrate repression used a releaming procedure to 
indicate that memories, once lost, could be restored ^ en 
the initial threat was removed. Repression in this approach 
was measured by an increase in recall after subsequent 
presentations with the threat eliminated. This kind of 
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methodology does not address itself directly to the repres­
sion process. Freud (1915, p. 86) states explicitly that 
ego-threatening information is blocked or removed from con­
sciousness and stored in the unconscious. It is therefore 
necessary to directly demonstrate the availability of these 
memories in the memory store as well as demonstrating the loss 
and gain in recall with the presence and absence of threat. 
The present design's use of retrieval cues addressed this 
issue. 
Male and female participants were asked to identify with 
the role of a counselor while observing a videotape of a 
counseling session with either a male or female counselee. 
Three levels of threat were the main independent variables and 
were determined by whether the observed videotape portrayed 
a direct sexual advance (high threat condition), an indirect 
sexual advance (medium threat condition) or a situation where 
there was no sexual advance (low threat condition). 
Repression was measured by performance on an open-ended 
memory test following the videotape presentation. Partici­
pants in the high threat condition were expected to use re­
pression as a defense, and have a lower level of performance 
than participants in either the low or medium threat condi­
tions, A silent presentation of the videotapes was later 
used to aid in the retrieval of repressed memories. The silent 
movements of the counselees on the videotapes were expected 
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to act as retrieval cues and enhance the performance of par­
ticipants in the high threat condition who previously had 
done poorly on the open-ended memory test. 
Since male and female participants viewed both male 
and female videotapes it was also possible to address an 
issue pertaining to sex differences in the use of repression. 
Males viewing male videotapes and females viewing female tapes 
were considered to be the more anxiety inducing, homosexual 
conditions. Males viewing female tapes and females viewing 
the male tapes were considered to be the less anxiety inducing, 
heterosexual conditions. The justification for this is based 
on the assumption that homosexual sexual advances are less 
socially acceptable and hence more threatening to the partic­
ipants. In respect to the present topic of repression, par­
ticipants in the homosexual conditions were expected to re­
press more of the memory of the videotapes than the partici­
pants in the heterosexual conditions. The implicit assumption 
here is that the larger the anxiety reaction, the greater the 
likelihood that a repression defense mechanism would be im­
plemented. 
Any specific prediction, related to whether males or 
females repress more under either heterosexual or homosexual 
conditions, was more difficult to make. Past research has 
directed little attention to this issue. In fact, all of 
the repression literature cited above avoided the issue by 
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either using participants of the same sex (e.g., Milliken 
and Kirchner, 1971, and D'Zurilla, 1965) or participants were 
randomly assigned to experimental and control groups without 
regard to sex (e.g., Flavell, 1955, and Zeller, 1950). 
Other investigators, not cited above, were interested in 
individual differences in repression other than those based 
on sex. For example, Truax (1957) screened persons by a 
unique formula based on the Hy and Pt scales on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory to form two experimental 
groups, ones that were high on expectancy to repress and ones 
low on repression expectancy. Eriksen (1952) divided par­
ticipants into groups based on individual differences in re­
sponse to neutral and anxiety-provoking words. Also, Witkin 
et al. (1962) presents empirical and theoretical evidence 
that field dependent persons, as measured by his two tests, 
the embedded figures and the rod and frame tests, tend to 
use repression more than field independent persons. 
Only the field dependent-independent approach lends it­
self in any way to the question of sex differences and even 
this approach is inconclusive. Maccoby and Jacklin (1974, 
p. 94) after reviewing the literature on field dependence 
found a substantial number of studies with no sex differences 
at all but in those studies where differences did occur, 
females were more field dependent, lending some credence to 
a hypothesis that females may be expected to repress more than 
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males. However, they further add that the sex differences 
don't typically emerge until adolescence and even then are 
limited to visual-spatial tasks, essentially negating any 
general expectancy that females would repress more than 
males. 
The main intent of the present study is to provide ex­
perimental evidence for the process of repression, and not to 
determine whether males or females use repression more under 
heterosexual or homosexual situations. However, part of the 
process of demonstrating repression is to show the relation­
ship between anxiety and the use of repression. The relation­
ship, as stated by Dollard and Miller (1950, p. 202), is that 
the greater the anxiety, the more the likelihood a repressive 
defense will be implemented. The question of sex differences 
arises when determining the type of sexual situation where 
males would be more anxious, or females more anxious, and 
therefore be more apt to use repression as a defense from 
this anxiety. 
The present study was not designed to specifically test 
different sexual situations for repressive responses. For 
example, only one male and one female stimulus person was used 
for each threatening situation, which does not allow for 
enough of a sample to induce definite statements about the 
response of males and females in general to different sexual 
situations. Rather, an attempt was made to provide many 
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situations of sexual threat to produce the greatest proba­
bility that repression would be demonstrated. It was pos­
sible, however, to make some speculative predictions, within 
the restrictions of the design, as to which sexual situation 
would produce the most anxiety and as a result provide a more 
probable structure for a repressive response. 
Sears (1965) provides some basis for the prediction that 
sex anxiety (anxiety reactions to sexual situations) is essen­
tially homosexual for males and heterosexual for females. 
With respect to the present design, this implies that males 
would tend to repress more in a homosexual stress situation 
and females would be more apt to repress in a heterosexual 
situation. Sears' conclusion is based on a study in which he 
correlated sex anxiety of male and female parents with the 
amount of caretaking behavior for male and female offspring. 
The sex anxiety for each participant was measured by two 
independent raters who listened to lengthy taped interviews 
with the parents, and the caretaking behavior was indexed by 
the average amount of time given to the physical care of each 
offspring. The results showed zero correlation between both 
the fathers' and mothers' sex anxiety and amount of care­
taking of the daughters, but a significant negative correla­
tion resulted for both the fathers and mothers of sons be­
tween parents' sex anxiety and the amount of caretaking. 
Sears interprets these findings to mean that both male and 
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female adults are more anxious around a boy's penis, since 
it is a more blatant sexual object than a girl's genitals. 
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974, p. 339) describe the logi­
cal consequences of the findings of Sears. They suggest that 
the father reacts more strongly to early signs of homosex­
uality in the son than in the daughter since the father's 
own homosexual feelings are aroused by the son. They also 
suggest that the mother reacts more strongly to the son, too, 
simply because homosexuality is more common in males. The 
extension of both the father's and mother's anxiety is that 
the male child develops an implicit homosexual anxiety that 
potentially strongly exists in his adult life. The female 
child, on the other hand, is protected from this process, at 
least to a larger extent than is the male child, and is po­
tentially less anxious about homosexuality as an adult. 
Neither Sears nor Maccoby and Jacklin attempt to explain 
Sears' second conclusion that sex anxiety would be essentially 
heterosexual in females, but the conditioning process respon­
sible for this conclusion seems apparent. Females are trained 
by their parents from an early age, especially at pubescence, 
not to trust and to fear males. They are typically punished 
for spending any time alone with a male and warned of the 
evil intent of all males, i.e., to seduce a female. Males, 
in contrast to this type of training, are encouraged to be 
sexually aggressive (Kagan, 1962, p. 66) and as a result are 
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probably less fearful of a heterosexual threat. The parents 
perhaps perceive a larger responsibility to protect the 
female child and condition her to fear males and the con­
sequences of intimacy with a male. 
In summary, different threatening sexual situations were 
devised to produce the greatest probability that repression 
would be used by participants to defend from the anxiety elic­
ited by the threats. It was predicted that sexual threat 
situations, and especially the more direct threats, would pro­
duce the most anxiety and the most repressive response as a 
consequence. It was also predicted that the homosexual condi­
tions, where participants viewed a stimulus person of the same 
sex, would probably be more threatening, and be more likely 
to involve the use of repression. Also, it was predicted 
that the homosexual situation would be more threatening to 
males than to females and as a result be a more likely situa­
tion for repression to be demonstrated. 
The actual demonstration of the repression process is 
the main focus of the experiment and is expected to be demon­
strated in two ways. First, recall is expected to be lower 
for those situations that has the most sexual threat for the 
participant. This means that participants are repressing 
more information with the presence of more threat. Second­
ly, when retrieval cues are provided, in the form of silent 
presentations of the videotapes, word recall is expected to 
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greatly increase for those conditions where information has 
been repressed. 
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CHAPTER II. METHOD 
Subjects 
There were 120 volunteers, 60 males and 60 females, who 
participated in the present experiment. All were students 
at Iowa State University enrolled in undergraduate courses 
in psychology, and each received an extra point towards their 
final grade for their participation. 
Videotapes 
An actor and an actress were each employed to act out a 
role of a client in a counseling setting during three separate 
interviews with a counselor. Each actor was given three 
scripts, written by the author, to memorize and then portray 
while being videotaped for a later presentation. The viewers 
(volunteer participants) of these tapes were later asked to 
assume the role of the counselor while watching the tapes on 
a television monitor. The scripts (see Appendix) included the 
lines that were spoken as well as instructions as to how 
threatening or intense the actors were to be. The three 
scripts represented three levels of threat (high, medium and 
low threat) for the persons viewing the videotape, and the 
actor/actress portrayed all three threat levels on three 
separate videotapes (six all together). 
All effort was made to maintain consistency across the 
six videotapes, allowing only the words and intensity of 
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threat to vary. The format of each tape followed a stan­
dard pattern. The tape began with fifteen seconds of silent 
close-up of the actor's face, and then-five seconds of 
fading back to a camera angle extending from the actor's 
(actress') knees to the head. Approximately two and one-half 
minutes of script and nonverbal s followed, ending with fif­
teen seconds of fading into a full-faced, silent close-up. 
Each tape was approximately three minutes long. 
Scripts 
The scripts were designed to have a maximum number of 
standard features. Each script had twelve lines, with each 
line consisting of an average of six words with two accom­
panying cues for performing gestures (nonverbals, e.g., "hand 
to face"). There were twelve nonverbals in total, and each 
appeared twice per script. The nonverbals were randomly 
assigned to a line and were in the same pattern for all three 
scripts. 
The theme of each script was a client's expression as to 
his/her feelings during a counseling session. The actor (ac­
tress) expressed these feelings towards a person off camera, 
presumably the person viewing the tape. The feelings expressed 
were in the form of: an explicit sexual "come-on" in the high 
threat condition, an indirect or implied sexual "come-on" in 
the medium threat condition, and a nonsexual or sexually neu­
tral expression in the low threat condition.- Males viewing 
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the male videotapes, and females viewing the female video­
tapes represented homosexual threat conditions and males 
viewing female, and females viewing male videotapes repre­
sented heterosexual threat conditions. 
To accentuate the threat in the high threat conditions, 
the scripts were presented with elevated intensity (raised 
voice) and were aimed more directly toward the viewer. In 
all presentations the viewer-participant was left alone in 
a room to view the client on a television monitor and thus 
the threat feelings were accentuated (e.g., Schachter, 1959). 
Six experienced counselors rated the tapes as to their level 
of threat to validate the labels of high, medium and low 
threat. 
In all the sessions described above, the "conversations" 
were one-sided in the sense that only the client could be 
seen on the television monitor and the client was also exclu­
sively the one that could be heard. The impression that the 
counselor was present was maintained by the client's directing 
all his/her comments toward the camera. The room in which 
the participants viewed the tapes was in fact a counseling 
room in a counseling service with a one-way mirror. (The 
experimenter observed the viewer-counselor through this mir­
ror.) A videotape player was used to play the tape and was 
present in the room along with the television monitor. 
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Conditions 
Client #1 represents the low-threat condition. The cli­
ent is receptive to information and pensive. He/she 
presents the impression of a person thinking out loud. The 
lines are directed more toward the person him/herself than 
toward the viewer. The client contemplates and explores how 
he/she is feeling. 
The lines and gestures in the low-threat condition were 
designed to be nonthreatening to the viewer-counselor. Freud 
defined a threat (Freud, 1915, p. 84) as occurring when a 
person ' s ideal self is overpowered by an alternate conception 
of self. Client #1 is neither demanding or overpowering. 
The viewer's ideal conception of him/herself is theoretically 
protected from any repudiation, and, by definition, is pre­
sented v/ith a nonthreatening situation. 
Client #2 represents the medium threat condition. The 
client presents the appearance of a highly tense individual 
who is afraid of his/her feelings and is having difficulties 
expressing them. The undertones of the verbalizations are 
sexual, yet are not expressed directly. For example, the 
statements: "I need something from you" and "I want some­
thing so badly," reflect a desire for the viewer yet does not 
explicitly state a sexual desire. The sexual intent is im­
plied and is threatening only to the extent that the viewer 
attends to the sexual implications. 
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Client #3 represents the high threat condition. The 
threat is presented directly at the viewer in a highly as­
saultive, desperate manner. The intentions of this client 
are obvious. The person is craving and demanding sexual 
contact with the viewer. For example, he/she states: "I 
want to touch you," "I need to hold you," and "I want you 
so badly." 
The viewer is treated as an object of the client's sex­
ual cravings and by definition (Freud, 1915, p. 84) is ex­
pected to feel highly threatened. In theory, the threat de­
velops from a repudiation of the viewer's ideal conception 
of self as a sexual being. This ideal conception is left 
bare and unprotected by the assaultive manner of client #3. 
Groups 
The participants were divided into experimental groups 
of males and females. Half of each group watched a female 
client tape and the other half of each group watched a male 
client tape. The groups were further divided in terms of 
whether they saw a high, medium, or low threat tape. Equal 
numbers of male and females were represented in each condi­
tion. 
Procedure 
The basic procedure was identical for all participants. 
Each person was invited into the counseling room and was 
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immediately given a justification for his/her participation 
in the present experiment. The justification was fabricated 
to diminish the possibility that people would be thinking 
about the purpose of the experiment rather than focusing 
their full attention on the videotape. The following infor­
mation was presented as an introduction: 
"This is a counseling experiment in which you will 
be asked to assume the role of a counselor listening 
to a client describe a personal problem. I want to 
instruct you briefly on what to look for in a coun­
seling situation. This instruction, on how to be 
a counselor, will be given to all participants in this 
experiment. The purpose of this study is to see how 
much this brief education aids a person who is 
training to be a counselor. If there are no ques­
tions, I would like to now read the educational 
material." 
The educational material was designed to help each partic­
ipant to be better trained to anticipate what they could pos­
sibly recall from a counseling simulation. It was also writ­
ten in such a manner to encourage the participant's aware­
ness of his/her own feelings during "counseling." In this 
way it was anticipated that each person would more fully ex­
perience any feelings of anxiety associated with the threat-
laden videotapes. The following was presented as education­
al material in oral form: 
"Most people believe that counseling is an advice-
giving process. This is erroneous. In fact, most 
counselors give little to no advice during a coun-
seing session. Most counseling involves listening 
to and observing client behavior. In order to get 
the full meaning as to what the client is saying, 
the counselor must attend to three kinds of client 
behavior. Obviously the counselor will listen to 
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the words the client is saying but a second thing 
the counselor attends to is the way in which the words 
are stated. That is, what does the voice sound like 
or what is the feeling behind the voice? The last 
thing a counselor can look at is the nonverbal beha­
vior or the gestures made by the client. For ex­
ample, how is the person sitting in the chair or 
what is he/she doing with his/her hands and legs? 
A good counselor observes all these kinds of beha­
viors of the client. 
Most importantly however, a counselor must also at­
tend to his/her own behavior. That is, what do 
you feel like while listening to the client. By 
being aware of his or her feelings, the counselor 
is better able to understand the counseling process 
and thus be more helpful to the client. 
In summary, the counselor attends to three kinds of 
client behavior: words, the sound of the voice, 
as well as the gestures of the client. And lastly, 
the counselor must be aware of his or her own feelings 
and reactions to the client. In this way an overall 
picture can be formulated and counseling will be 
most effective. Do you have any questions?" 
The participants were then given the following instruc­
tions : 
"I want you to pretend for a moment that you have just 
completed a training program to become a counselor. 
You are now a counselor here at this counseling ser­
vice. This is your office and you are about to see 
a student concerning a personal problem that he/she 
is having. In just a few moments you will be left 
alone to watch, on the television monitor in front 
of you, a videotape recording of a counseling session. 
You will only see the client because I want you to 
imagine that you are the counselor. All you have to 
do is listen and watch, the client will do all the 
talking." 
"It is very important that you imagine that you ac­
tually are the counselor because following the tape 
presentation, you will be given questions to answer 
about your client as if you actually had participated 
in the counseling session." 
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At this point, the experimenter turned on the videotape 
machine and left the room to observe through the one-way 
mirror in the adjacent room. When the counseling simulation 
was completed (see Appendix for scripts), the experimenter 
returned to the counseling office, shut off the videotape 
equipment and administered what was referred to as a "feeling 
inventory." The feeling inventory was actually Zuckerman's 
(1960) affect adjective check list for the measurement of 
anxiety (see Appendix). This measure was used to determine to 
what extent participants had an anxiety reaction to each 
videotape. The participants were then given a free recall 
test of retention. The test consisted of one sheet of paper 
with instructions at the top (see Appendix). The test was 
open-ended to avoid providing retrieval cues for any poten­
tially repressed information. The following were the written 
instructions for the free recall test: 
Recall as many as you can of the twelve sentences you 
just heard. Try to write the sentences as closely as 
possible to the original words. Be sure to write the 
sentence even if you are not sure of the wording. The 
order of the sentences is not important. 
"An ample amount::of time was provided (five minutes) to 
complete the test and to think about the counseling session. 
This ample time period was designed to let the participants 
focus on any threatening memories and, according to Madison's 
(1961) conception of the repression process, manipulate from 
conscious memory any components of the memory that were 
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severely ego threatening. Thus, this initial measure was used 
to reflect memory loss of threatening information. 
Following the initial free recall test, the partici­
pant was given a second test of retention. This measure was 
an objective test designed to cue material in memory that was 
previously not recalled. The test consisted of watching the 
videotapes again but this time without the sound. The non­
verbal actions of the actors were the memory cues provided as 
potential aids in the retrieval of any repressed information. 
The following were the written instructions provided for the 
objective test: 
Please watch the videotape again. This time there will 
be no sound. Each time the client appears to be say­
ing a sentence write the sentence down you think he/ 
she has said. Do not worry about recalling the sen­
tences out of order. 
Following this final test, the participants were given a 
briefing as to the actual purpose of this experiment. 
Scoring 
Two raters (both naive to the experimental manipulations) 
were used to independently score the results of both the free 
and cued recall tests. Whether a sentence was recalled accu­
rately was a subjective decision of the rater. An average 
of the raters' scores was used as the final score. The anx­
iety measure was objectively scored according to the instruc­
tions described by Zuckerman (1960) . 
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CHAPTER III. RESULTS 
Scoring 
Consistency between raters appeared to be high. Dif-
erences between the two raters' scores were never greater 
than two sentences for any given score. Specifically for 
free recall, 90% of the two raters' scores were within one 
sentence correctly recalled (38% were rated exactly the same 
and 52% had a difference of one sentence). For cued recall, 
again, 90% of the two raters' scores were within one sentence 
apart in ratings (49% were rated exactly the same and 41% 
had a difference of one sentence). Scores ranged from 2 to 
9 for free recall and from 3 to 11 for cued recall. 
Analysis 
Analysis of variance was used as the main statistical 
test (Kirk, 1968, p. 39). One of the main assumptions of 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) is that variances of compared 
distributions are homogeneous. To help insure the homo­
geneity of variance, a square root transformation was per­
formed for each experimental hypothesis using both the raw 
data and the square root data. The results for each test 
were identical for both types of data and only the raw data 
figures are reported below. 
Tukey's Honestly Significantly Different Test (HSD) was 
used when a multiple comparison of means was needed. Tukey's 
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HSD is a more conservative test than conducting a series of 
t-statistics (Kirk, 1968, p, 89). 
Anxiety Measure 
Zuckerman's Anxiety Inventory (Zuckerman, 1960) was used 
as an index of the participant's emotional reaction to the 
stimulus videotapes. Anxiety measure scores ranged from 2 to 
18. Scores increased (higher anxiety) with increased video­
tape threat, F(2, 108) = 6.81, £<.002. The increase in anx­
iety scores occurred between the low threat condition and the 
other two (medium and high) threat conditions (Table 1). 
Table 1. Multiple comparison of mean scores on Zuckerman's 
anxiety measure for High (T_), medium (Tg) and low 
threat (T,) conditions, using Tukey's Honestly 
Significantly Different (HSD) Test. 
2.1* 1.9* 
. 20  
*p< .01, HSD = q iQg = .44 
No other differences occurred between anxiety score means 
(Table 2). Of particular notice was the lack of difference 
between anxiety score means for the homosexual and hetero­
sexual conditions. 
T^  = 7.6 
2^ " 
T3 = 9.5 
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Table 2. Anova table for Zuckerman anxiety measure. 
Source df ss ms F P 
Sex of participant 1 . 83  .83 .1 .7447 
Homo-Heterosexual Condition (H) 1 .13 ,13 .02 .892 
Threat 2 107. 47 53. 73 6.8 .002 
Sex X H 1 .3 .3 .04 .84 
Sex X Threat 2 3 .46 1. 73 .22 .8055 
H X Threat 2 11, .26 5, .63 .71 .5031 
Sex X H X Threat 2 6. 2 3. 1 .39 .681 
Error 108 851. ,8 7. . 89  
Recall Tests 
Free recall was used as a measure of initial reaction and 
cued recall was used as an index of the presence of non-
accessible (repressed) material. Free recall was predicted to 
be higher for lower threat conditions and cued recall was pre­
dicted to result in equal recall for all conditions. The 
results for both free and cued recall are shown in Figure 1. 
Free recall was essentially equal for low, medium and 
high threat conditions (Table 3) while for cued recall, recall 
of sentences increased as the threat level increased F(2, 108) 
= 8.23, £<.0008 (Table 4). 
8 
Cued Recall 
to 
Free Recall 
I (7.6) (9.7) (9.5) '(anxiety scores) 
Low 
Threat 
Medium 
Threat 
High 
Threat 
Figure 1. Mean Sentence recall scores 
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Table 3. Anova table for free recall scores. 
Source df ss ms F P 
Sex of participant 1 .67 .67 .31 .58 
Homo-Heterosexual Condition (H) 1 .07 .07 .03 00
 
Threat 2 7.11 3.56 1.66 .19 
Sex X H 1 4.41 4.41 2.06 .15 
Sex X Threat 2 .45 .22 .10 .9 
H X Threat 2 6.65 3.32 1.55 .21 
Sex X H X Threat 2 4.32 2.16 1.01 .37 
Error 108 231.3 2.14 
Table 4. Anova table for cued recall scores. 
Source df ss ms F P 
Sex of participant 1 4.8 4.8 1.81 .18 
Homo-Heterosexual Condition (H) 1 4.8 4.8 1.81 .18 
Threat 2 43,72 21.86 8,23 . 0009 
Sex X H 1 14.7 14.7 5.53 .0193 
Sex X Threat 2 .95 .47 .17 .837 
H X Threat 2 . 1.85 .93 .35 .712 
Sex X H X Threat 2 8.15 4.07 1.53 .2188 
Error 108 287.0 2.55 
The increase in cued recall with increased level of 
threat, was the only significant recall test result for both 
cued and free recall. Even cued and free recall in each 
homosexual condition were equal respectively to cued and free 
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recall in each heterosexual condition. In other words, 
neither the type of threat nor the sex of the participant 
affected the retention of material in both free and cued 
recall, 
A separate analysis using only high threat condition 
scores was predicted to accentuate the effect of each threat 
on recall. Specifically, free recall was predicted to be 
lower for the more sexually threatening material and en­
hance the cued recall of that material. This did not result. 
The results for high threat scores were similar to combined 
high, medium and low threat results (Tables 5 and 6). 
Table 5. Anova table for free recall in the high threat 
condition. 
Source df ss ms f p 
Sex of participant 1 0 0 0 1.0 
Homo-Heterosexual Condition (H) 1 4.9 4.9 2.48 .12 
Sex X H 1 3.6 3.6 1.82 .1821 
Error 36 71 1.97 
Table 6. Anova table for cued recall in high threat condition. 
Source df ss ms f p 
Sex of participant 1 .63 .63 .21 .6562 
Homo-Heterosexual Condition (E) 1 .02 .02 .01 .9253 
Sex X H 1 15.62 15.62 5.17 .0273 
Error 36 108.7 3.02 
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Difference Scores 
A main index of repression in the present study was the 
use of retrieval cues to demonstrate the presence of non-
accessible, repressed, material in memory. The cued recall 
measure was used as retrieval cues. The difference between 
free and cued recall was an index of the effectiveness of 
the cues in the retrieval of threatening material. The 
greater the difference (cued minus free recall), the great­
er the indication of the presence of repressed material. 
Free and cued recall scores were graphed to visually 
check the ranges of the two distributions of scores. 
The distributions appeared homogenous and permitted an 
analysis of difference scores. The difference scores in­
creased with increased threat level, F (2, 108) = 10.93, 
2 < - 0002, and are shown in Figure 2. 
Sentence recall was higher with cued than with free re­
call. Specifically, there was no significant difference 
between cued and free recall in the low threat condition. 
Medium and high threat difference score means (cued minus 
free recall) were equal and both were greater than the low 
threat difference score mean (Figure 2 and Table 7). 
" .  2  
-.4 
-.6 
-.8 
-1.0 (7 .6 )  
Low 
Threat 
(9 .7 )  
Medium 
Threat 
(9.5) (anxiety scores) 
High 
Threat 
Figure 2. Mean sentence recall difference scores 
(cued minus free recall) 
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Table 7. Muliple comparison of mean difference scores 
(cued minus free recall) for high (To), medium, 
(T«) and low (T,) threat conditions using Tukey's 
Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test. 
T^  = -.15 0 1.40* 1.63* 
T^  = 1.25 - .23 
Tg = 1.48 
= Threat level (T^  = low) 
*p<,01, HSD = q.01,108 =' 
Difference scores did result in a significant interac­
tion between the type of sexual conditon (homosexual or hetero­
sexual) and the sex of the participant, F(1,108) = 12.41, 
£<.001. This result is illustrated in Figure 3. 
As predicted, no other significant effects resulted with 
both the analysis of difference scores in general (Table 8), 
and with difference scores specific to the high threat video­
tape condition (Table 9). 
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Table 8. Anova table for diffemece scores (cued minus free 
recall) 
Source df ss ms F P 
Sex of participant 1 1. 87 1. 87 .66 .5766 
Homo-Heterosexual Condition (H) 1 3. 67 3. 67 1, .29 .2563 
Threat 2 62. 01 31. ,01 10. 93 .0002 
Sex X H 1 35, .21 35. 21 12, .41 .001 
Sex X Threat 2 1. 25 .62 .22 .805 
H X Threat 2 15. 45 7. ,72 2, .72 .0683 
Sex X H X Threat 2 8. 82 4. 41 1, .55 .2144 
Error 108 306. 3 2, .84 
Table 9. Anova table for difference scores (cued minus free 
recall) in high threat condition 
Source df ss ms F P 
Sex of participant 1 .62 .62 .26 .6158 
Homo-Heterosexual Condition (H) 1 4 .22 4 .22 1.79 .1862 
Sex X H 1 34 .22 34 .22 14.51 .0008 
Error 36 84 .9 2 .35 
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3. Combined high, medium and low mean sentence recall 
difference scores (cued minus free recall) 
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The question arises whether further analysis of dif­
ference scores should be considered. For example, so far 
threat has been demonstrated to have a significant inter­
action with difference scores (Figure 2) and anxiety has 
been demonstrated to be related to threat (Table 2). What 
remains unclear is the specific relationship between anx­
iety level and difference scores. In theoretical terms : 
What is the effect of anxiety on memory? Two ANOVAs were 
performed to examine this question. 
For both analyses the relationship between anxiety 
and difference scores was analyzed within each threat level. 
The purpose of this statistical manipulation was to keep 
the experimental variable of threat constant in order to 
focus on the isolated effects of anxiety. In the first 
analysis anxiety scores were trichotomized. That is, 
scores were divided into thirds of a normal distribution 
of anxiety scores. This was done to compare different 
anxiety levels with the difference scores. In the second 
analysis, anxiety scores were left as a continuous variable. 
In both analyses the results were negative. The main effect 
for anxiety and the correlation between anxiety and dif­
ference scores were found to be non-significant. 
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CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSION 
Overview 
The present study attempted to provide experimental evi­
dence for the Freudian-defined process of repression. The 
results provided only partial support of the theory. Freud 
(1915, p. 86) defined repression as a defense mechanism used 
to protect a person from experiencing painful memories. In 
order to demonstrate repression, the presence of anxiety should 
impair the recall of threat-associated material. Also, the 
material must be shown to be present in memory and not simply 
a product of memory loss due to response competition (Holmes, 
1972). 
The results for the recall measures in the present study 
provided only partially supportive evidence. Contrary to re­
pression theory, participants did not demonstrate lower recall 
with the presence of anxiety. Consistent with repression 
theory, retrieval cues did increase the recall of anxiety-as­
sociated material. In other words, memory was not impaired 
by threat, but more of the threatening material was shown to 
be available with the aid of retrieval cues (Figures 1 and 2). 
The alternate interference, or competing response, hypothesis 
offered by Holmes, 1972, did not provide a more parsimonious 
explanation of the results. Other hypotheses were implicated 
in the explanation of the inconsistent results. 
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Methodological innovations 
The basic methodological innovations (the type of re­
trieval cue and the type of anxiety situation) appeared to 
provide an adequate experimental design. The design was ef­
fective in providing an anxious situation for repression to 
occur and the threat of watching a videotape counseling ses­
sion did produce an anxious response. The design was not 
effective in providing a variety of anxious situations, which 
limited the number of possible demonstrations of repression. 
The silent presentation of the videotapes was effective 
as a retrieval cue in that cued recall was consistently higher 
than free recall. This finding is particularly pronounced 
in that cued recall was subsequent to free recall and was sub­
ject to the potentially interfering effects of the free re­
call and anxiety measure tasks. Specifically, cued recall 
scores increased with increased levels of threat. This im­
plied that the retrieval cues aided in the recall of threat-
associated material, which provided the main evidence for 
a repression theory demonstration. 
Manipulation checks 
The results of the anxiety measure indicated that the 
threat manipulation was effective in producing an anxious 
response. As predicted, the high and medium threat material 
did produce higher anixety scores than did low threat material. 
The medium threat condition did not conform to the pattern of 
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the predictions. It produced an anxiety response equal to 
the high threat condition, in contrast to the prediction of 
scoring somewhere between the high and low threat. These 
results implied that the design was effective in general in 
producing an anxious situation, but was not effective in 
providing a variety of levels of anxious situations where 
repression may occur to a greater or lesser degree. 
The homosexual and heterosexual conditions also resulted 
in an equal level of measured anxiety response. It was pre­
dicted that homosexual material would be more anxiety induc­
ing than heterosexual material and more likely to produce a 
repressive response. Since anxiety reactions were equal, it 
was not possible to directly attribute any memory loss, and 
cueing enhancement of memory, to an anxiety induced repres­
sion process. The cueing effects are discussed later from 
this perspective. 
The same logic applied when the sex of the participant 
was taken into account. According to Sears (1965), sexual 
anxiety is essentially homosexual for males and heterosex­
ual for females. This implied that males would repress more 
in the homosexual condition than females, and females would 
repress more in the heterosexual condition than males. This 
prediction was not supported in the present study. Anxiety 
measures indicated equal anxiety reactions in both homo­
sexual and heterosexual conditions for both sexes. This 
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resulted even with a separate analysis for high threat 
scores, which potentially would enhance a demonstration of 
differences in anxiety scores. Again, the implication was 
that memory losses, and enhancement in recall due to cueing, 
were not attributable to a repression process. Anxiety dif­
ferences were simply not demonstrated and a repression mech­
anism could not be expected to be implemented. 
Main Findings 
Free recall 
The most surprising results were with the free recall 
test. It was anticipated that the more threatening and anx­
iety inducing videotapes would result in the lower reten­
tion scores on the free recall measure. As reported above, 
free recall was equal for all conditions. High threat re­
call equaled low threat recall and homosexual threat equaled 
heterosexual threat recall. This is somewhat inconsis­
tent with repression theory. Repression by definition 
(Freud, 1915) is the process of withholding painful events 
from conscious memory. With the present results, events were 
recalled equally regardless of the level of associated pain 
or anxiety. 
It was possible that two different processes were in­
volved with the recall, or lack of recall, of high threat and 
low threat material, resulting in similar levels of recall. 
For example, low threat material would not be expected to be 
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repressed due to the low level of associated anxiety Memory 
loss (recall of less than the full twelve sentences) could be 
attributed to simple forgetting due to decay (Brown, 1958) 
or response competition (Barnes and Underwood, 1959; Holmes, 
1972). Memory loss in the high threat condition in contrast 
could be attributed to a repression process. The anxiety 
might have induced the participants to protect themselves 
from painful memories by maintaining the threat out of con­
scious memory. 
Repression and simple forgetting could have resulted 
in the same display of memory loss. The way to differenti­
ate between the two is by determining if the memory is ac­
tually lost (forgotten) or just inaccessible (repressed) in 
unconscious memory. This study used retrieval cues to dif­
ferentiate these processes. 
Cued recall 
The effects of retrieval cues (the silent presentation 
of videotapes) had a varied effect on recall dependent upon 
the condition. In general, recall was enhanced by the use 
of retrieval cues. Cues were predicted to be most effica­
cious in those conditions where anxiety was present. The 
cues were expected to aid in the recovery of repressed 
(anxious) material. The results conformed to this predic­
tion, Cued recall of sentences increased as anxiety re­
sponses increased (Figure 1). The more anxious the situation, 
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the more the retrieval cue aided in the recall of the as­
sociated material. This result was the most explicit evi­
dence in the present study towards a demonstration of a 
repression process. 
An alternate explanation for the results for the cued 
recall in Figure 1 is also possible. Perhaps higher cued 
recall in the higher threat conditions was due to more sa­
lient cues in high threat verses low threat conditions. 
Perhaps the actor and actress provided more animated, and 
thus more salient, nonverbal cues in the higher threat con­
ditions. This would account for higher cued recall with 
higher threat conditions. This explanation was possible 
but less likely than the above repression theory interpre­
tation. Both the actor and actress were trained to provide 
the same type of nonverbal cues in all threat conditions 
(high, medium and low) . While it was possible that the 
exaggeration of the same nonverbal cues differed from high 
to low threat, effort was made to minimize the variability. 
In any event, it can be concluded that the memory loss 
with high and low threat material can be attributed to two 
separate processes. Low threat material was forgotten and 
memory was not enhanced by the presence of cues. This im­
plied either decay or an interference process had taken 
place. With high threat material, recall was enhanced with 
the presence of cues. This implied that information was 
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present in memory but not accessible. This process is anal-
agous to repression mechanisms. 
Other results using retrieval cues were less compelling 
as a repression demonstration. In the homosexual and hetero­
sexual threat conditions, the effects of cueing did not con­
form to predictions (Figure 3). Cueing was expected to re­
sult in higher recall in the more anxious conditions. The 
anxiety was expected to inhibit retrieval mechanisms, and the 
cued recall was expected to reinstate the mechanism, result­
ing in higher recall. This would mean higher recall of homo­
sexual material than heterosexual material, higher cued re­
call for males than for females in the homosexual condition, 
and higher cued recall for females than males in the hetero­
sexual condition. All of these predictions represent higher 
cued recall of the more anxious material. 
As stated above, this pattern of results did not occur. 
Cueing did enhance recall of homosexual material but it had 
the same enhancing effect for heterosexual material. Even 
more contrary to a repression theory interpretation, cueing 
had the opposite effect in predictions for males and females. 
Cueing enhanced recall more for females in the homosexual 
condition than for males. Males were aided more by cues in 
the heterosexual condition (See Figure 3). The cueing did 
enhance recall, but opposite to the predicted pattern. 
Homosexual and heterosexual threat conditions 
It appeared from the results for homo- and heterosexual 
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threat conditions that cues aided in memory recall but not 
specifically in the recall of repressed material. According 
to Atkinson and Shiffrin's model of repression, retrieval 
cues aid in the recall of threat-associated material. This 
threat-associated material stays out of consciousness, accor­
ding to Freud (1915, p. 86), as a protection from painful 
anxiety. To demonstrate repression in the present study, 
material must be shown to produce an anxious response as in­
dexed by Zuckerman's anxiety measure. An anxious response 
would indicate the need to use a repression mechanism to 
defend against the anxiety. 
As described above, anxiety responses were equal among 
the various sexual conditions (homo- and heterosexual con­
ditions for males and females). The predicted pattern of 
anxiety responses did not result. This lack of differences 
in anxiety responses among sexual conditions negated the pos­
sibility of using retrieval cues in those conditions to demon­
strate a repression process. One sexual threat was not more 
anxious for a participant than any other sexual threat. This 
meant that enhancement in cued recall over free recall could 
not specifically be attributed to the enhancement of recall 
of anxious material. 
Perhaps the Zuckerman measure was not an accurate mea­
sure of the anxiety reactions. Even if this were the case, 
the pattern of results for cued recall in the homo- and 
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heterosexual conditions were opposite to predictions based 
on repression theory. Conditions predicted to be more anx­
ious for participants had less enhancement in recall with 
the presence of retrieval cues. 
Competing response hypothesis 
The interference hypothesis posited by Holmes (1972) 
and D'Zurilla (1965) was also not a viable explanation of 
the present results. The interference hypothesis affirms 
that a threat (ego-threatening event), or an ego-enhancing 
event such as strong positive feedback, interferes with the 
retention of associated material. This is a competing re­
sponse hypothesis where participants are hypothesized to at­
tend more to the highly salient threat than to the less sali­
ent associated material. As described in the introduction, 
the present study had as synonymous the threat used to invoke 
anxiety and the actual target material, recollection of which 
(or lack of recollection) was used as an index of repression. 
This design by itself made competing response a less viable 
hypothesis. Even if participants in the present study did 
find some form of the threat to be a competing stimulus, 
there should have been some corresponding difference between 
the free recall of high and low threat material. High threat 
should have resulted in higher recall than low threat. 
According to Broadbent (1957), material given more attention 
is recalled at a higher level. This would have demonstrated 
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more attention to high threat, than low threat material. As 
described above, this was not the case: free recall was 
equal in all threat conditions. The increase in threat did 
not increase free recall, contrary to predictions based on 
a competing response hypothesis. 
This same logic applied to the presently unexplained 
results of the specific conditions represented in Figure 3. 
Some factor resulted in retrieval cues enhancing recall more 
for males in the heterosexual condition and more for females 
in the homosexual condition. It was not a demonstration of 
repression because material in these conditions were rated 
as equally anxious. A repressive mechanism was not more 
likely to be used in any one condition and material was 
equally likely to be recalled with the presence of retrieval 
cues. An interference theory was also not viable since the 
threat and the material to be recalled were synonymous, and 
increased saliency of the threat did not result in increased 
recall of the threat. 
Design artifact 
Present theory did not explain the results displayed in 
Figure 3. The results appeared to be an artifact of the 
videotape recordings. The silent presentation of the female 
videotapes somehow cued recall more than the silent presen­
tations of the male videotapes. In both conditions, where 
recall was aided more by the cues (homosexual condition for 
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the females and heterosexual for the males), the silent 
presentation of a female videotape was used as the cue. 
Simply stated, the female actress provided better non-ver­
bal cues than the male actor. This was corroborated by in­
formal comments of the therapists v^ o rated the tapes and 
observed the actress to enunciate words more than the actor. 
This apparently provided more salient cues with the silent 
presentation of the female videotape. 
Theoretical Implications 
It would be difficult to make any far-reaching conclu­
sions about Freudian repression theory based on the results 
of the present study. The results were supportive only in 
part to a repression theory demonstration and were inconsis--
tent with varied experimental conditions. On the positive 
side, some basic aspects of the repression process were 
demonstrated with the alternate interference hypothesis being 
shown to be a less viable alternative. This in itself is 
encouraging to future research and somewhat tempers the pes­
simistic outlook of Holmes (1974). 
It is important to be cautious in purporting to demon­
strate any process as intricate and profound as Freudian 
repression theory. A recent survey of research on Freudian 
theory, (Fisher and Greenberg, 1977) emphasized that it is 
probably impossible to demonstrate the existence of any 
Freudian concept in any one study. These authors indicated 
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that even the best experiment can only depict a part of a 
well-thought-out theory such as Freudian repression. The 
central issue is not whether Freud's ideas are true or false 
but rather to what extent are his ideas valid (Fisher and 
Greenberg, 1977, p. 11). 
The present study provides limited support to an in­
formation processing system that presumably protects a per­
son from painful memories. This system resembles the concept 
of repression described by Freud (1915) and, translated in­
to information processing language by Atkinson and Shiffrin 
(1971), in that threatening information was shown to be more 
available in conscious memory than accessible. The question 
remains as to what aspect of the threat produced this repres­
sion-like finding. The final statistical analysis, reported 
at the end of the result section, was unsuccessful in demon­
strating a direct relationship between anxiety and difference 
scores. Future research is needed to establish a clearer 
relationship between anxiety and the loss and retrieval of 
repressed information. 
In the future, the present study could be replicated 
with the addition of a second and third anxiety measure. The 
first measure would be presented, as in the present study, 
to index the initial anxiety reaction to the threatening 
material. The second measure would be presented after the 
free recall task and the third following cued recall. In 
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this way anxiety reactions could be tracked with respect to 
the progression of a repression process. The repeated 
measure would also help to focus on anxiety with respect to 
its effect on memory, in contrast to the present study's 
focus on threat. 
Future designs could also improve upon the present study 
by equating the meaningfulness of the stimulus material for 
each threat level. As discussed above, the present study 
resulted in some ambiguity with the interpretation of free 
recall scores. Free recall was predicted to be lower for 
high threat material but instead resulted in equal retention 
for all conditions. This difficulty may be circumvented by 
equating initial recall for all conditions. The mechanics 
of this procedure could be rather basic. A control condition 
could be added (e.g., Flavell, 1955) where the threat manipu­
lation would be explained to participants to potentially 
eliminate anxiety reactions. Recall for each condition could 
be compared without the experimental manipulation of threat. 
Stimulus material could be repeatedly redesigned until the 
material in each condition was at an equal recall potential. 
In conclusion, the present study appears to provide 
a useful method in researching the repression process. The 
present results are inconclusive but the design is amenable 
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to additional experimental conditions that may be fruitful 
in the demonstration of a repression process. 
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Client #1 
This client represents the low threat condition. The 
lines and the gestures of the actors are designed to not 
threaten the viewer. The actors are not demanding or over­
powering but rather they are informative. They are serious 
and concerned with what they are talking about, yet the 
intensity of the concentration is directed inward. They are 
in fact intense throughout the script, but intense about 
how they feel about themselves, not the viewer. 
SCRIPT 
(15 seconds of silence facing the camera) 
I'm feeling very good about myself (close eyes, play with 
hair) 
Counseling has helped me a great deal, (smile, cross arms) 
I don't hide'-what I'm feeling, 
I have new feelings every day, 
I've even learned to express myself, 
I like who I am, 
I'm liking different kinds of people, 
I'm more open to new experiences, 
I want to continue to leam, 
I want to lose my inhibition, 
I'm glad I came to see you. 
Thank you very much for the help. 
(lean forward, bite lip) 
(look away, hand to face) 
(finger in mouth, smile) 
(play with hair, close 
eyes) 
(rub hands, look away) 
(hand to face, clench fist) 
(cross arms, hand to neck) 
(bite lip, lean forward) 
(hand to neck, finger in 
mouth) 
(clench fist, rub hands) 
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Client #2 
This client represents the medium threat condition. The 
threat is a somewhat overpowering assault on the viewer's 
self-esteem as a sexual being, but is not directly aimed at 
the viewer. Instead, the actor portrays an air of sexual in­
tensity but the viewer is not entirely clear as to whom the 
strong feelings are being directed. The actors create an 
image of confusion about their feelings. The sexual reference 
is fairly obvious but not directly, and the viewers must de­
cide for themselves if the threat is directed towards them. 
The actors are aware of the sexual feelings they are ex­
periencing, but they are both frightened of the feelings, and 
highly uncomfortable with expressing them. The resultant 
message is an intense hidden sexual expression that is stated 
indirectly. 
SCRIPT 
(15 seconds of silence facing the camera) 
(close eyes, play with 
hair) 
(smile, cross arms) 
(lean forward, bite lip) 
(look away, hand to face) 
(finger in mouth, smile) 
(play with hair, close 
eyes) 
(rub hands, look away) 
(hand to face, clench 
fist) 
I'm getting too involved with you, (cross arms, hand to neck) 
You won't give me what I want, (bite lip, lean forward) 
I can't stand this pressure, (hand to neck, finger in 
mouth) 
I want something so badly, (clench fist, rub hands) 
I'm not sure about you, 
I'm nervous about being here. 
It's hard to be alone with you, 
I have these strange feelings, 
I'm afraid of what I'm feeling, 
I need something from you, 
I want to be close to you, 
I should really leave here. 
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Client #3 
This client represents the high threat condition. The 
threat is an overpowering assault on the viewer's self-esteem 
as a sexual being. That is, the viewer has an image of an 
ideal self in terms of his or her own sexuality. As outsiders, 
we do not know what that image is like but the intent here is 
to completely overpower any ideal image of what a sexual encoun­
ter is like for the individual. The actor totally forces 
his/herself onto the viewer without awareness or regard for 
the needs of the viewer. The sexual approach or "come-on" is 
a strong, direct expression of the sexual needs of the actor-
client. The client is demanding, overpowering, overtly seduc­
tive, intensely craving satisfaction of his/her own sexual 
needs. The viewer is made to feel like a depersonalized, sexual 
object. The client's intent is to use the person for their own 
sexual satisfaction and avoids making the individual feel unique 
as a person. 
SCRIPT 
(15 seconds of silence facing the camera) 
I needed to see you, (close eyes, play with 
hair) 
You make me feel so good, (smile, cross arms) 
I want to be close to you, (lean forward, bite lip) 
Being here with you excites me, (look away, hand to face) 
Anything can happen when we're alone,(finger in mouth, smile) 
I love smelling you here next to me, (play with hair, close 
eyes) 
I want to touch you, (rub hands, look away) 
I'm trembling all over, (hand to face, clench 
fist) 
I need to hold you, (cross arms, hand to neck) 
I'm feeling so intense, (bite lip, lean forward) 
I can't stand this pressure, (hand to neck, finger in 
mouth) 
I want you so badly, (clench fist, rub hands) 
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Zuckerman ' s Affect Adj active Check List 
PUT A CHECK MARK BESIDE EVERY WORD THAT DESCRIBES A FEELING 
THAT YOU PRESENTLY HAVE AND/OR HAVE EXPERIENCED SINCE YOU'VE 
ENTERED THIS ROOM. CHECK AS MANY AS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE. 
SAD SHAKY SEXUAL 
CALM DISTANT ALIVE 
CONCERNED^  TIRED CONTENT 
BORED PLEASANT EMBARRASSED 
AFRAID NOSTALGIC PEACEFUL 
CHEERFUL DISAPPOINTED FEARFUL 
NERVOUS SURPRISED RESIGNED 
ANNOYED CONCERNED JOYFUL 
HUNGRY DESPERATE PANICKY 
LONELY STIFF DEFENSIVE 
HATEFUL STEADY WEARY 
GUILTY EXPOSED. SECURE 
GLAD LOVING PROUD 
CONTENTED INTERESTED TENDER 
HURT FRIGHTED SECURE 
HAPPY UPSET AMUSED 
ANXIOUS UNCOMFORTABLE TERRIFIED 
SILLY RELAXED INSECURE 
TRUSTING WORRYING HOT 
TENSE THOUGHTFUL REMOVED 
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Free Recall Test 
CONDITION: M F - H M L 
SEX: M F S# 
INSTRUCTIONS ; 
Recall as many as you can of the twelve sentence you just 
heard. Try to write the sentences as closely as possible to 
the original words. Be sure to write the sentence even if you 
are not sure of the wording. The order of the sentences is not 
important. 
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Cued Recall Test 
CONDITION: M F - H M L 
SEX: MF S# 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
Please •watch the videotape again. This time there will 
be no sound. Each time the client appears to be saying a 
sentence, write down the sentence that you think is being 
said. The tape will pause long enough to give you enough 
time to do this. Look up after you are through writing to 
prepare for the next sentence. Do not worry about recalling 
the sentences out of order. 
